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Abstract 
This article explores the Fixed-term Parliaments Act’s less-obvious implications. First, it 
discusses why Theresa May found calling the 2017 election so straightforward, and notes what 
this implies for how FTPA works. Second, it looks at executive-legislative relations. FTPA 
removed the government’s ability to designate controversial parliamentary votes matters of 
confidence, and introduced a fourteen-day cushion between a no-confidence vote and 
parliament’s dissolution. In the process it shifted the balance of power from ministers to back-
benchers, to an extent potentially greater than most observers recognise. Third, it considers 
the more outlandish possibilities raised by FTPA’s imposition of a fourteen-day waiting period 
after a government’s defeat on a no-confidence motion before a new election can be called. 
It is possible, for example, for rebel MPs from the governing party to use the no-confidence 
procedure to force concessions from the cabinet. Finally, it assesses FTPA’s long-term survival 
prospects, and what repeal would involve.  
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When the Fixed-term Parliaments Act (FTPA) passed in the summer of 2011, it fundamentally 
altered – at least in theory – how British governments form, function, and fall. FTPA imposed 
new statutory limitations on the Prime Minister’s historic power, under the Royal Prerogative, 
to dissolve parliament and call a general election at a politically opportune moment of their 
choosing. Elections should now normally take place every five years, unless one of two 
scenarios occurs: either two-thirds of all MPs agree to permit the government to call an early 
election, or the government loses a no-confidence vote and no viable alternative government 
emerges within fourteen days.  
 
This article explores FTPA’s outer limits and less-obvious implications. First, it discusses why 
Theresa May found calling the 2017 election so straightforward, and notes what this implies 
for how FTPA works. Second, it looks at executive-legislative relations. FTPA removed the 
government’s ability to designate controversial parliamentary votes matters of confidence, 
and introduced a fourteen-day cushion between a no-confidence vote and parliament’s 
dissolution. In the process it shifted the balance of power from ministers to back-benchers, 
to an extent potentially greater than most observers recognise. Third, it considers the more 
outlandish possibilities raised by FTPA’s imposition of a fourteen-day waiting period after a 
government’s defeat on a no-confidence motion before a new election can be called. It is 
possible, for example, for rebel MPs from the governing party to use the no-confidence 
procedure to force concessions from the cabinet. Finally, it assesses FTPA’s long-term survival 







Theresa May’s election 
 
FTPA emerged from the coalition agreement between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
Parties after the 2010 election. Its stated purpose was to fix the gap between elections at five 
years. In that, it failed. On 18 April 2017, less than two years on from the previous election, 
Theresa May announced that she planned to go to the country. It was a bold statement, given 
she still needed to secure super-majority support in parliament. But it worked. The next day 
522 MPs – well over the two-thirds threshold set by FTPA – approved an early election.  
 
Under FTPA, a government possessing a parliamentary majority and determined to force an 
early election could conceivably engineer a so-called ‘constructive’ no-confidence vote in 
itself. It might face a legal challenge – by stipulating in statute what constitutes a no-confidence 
motion, FTPA makes the issue justiciable – but even if a court agreed to hear the case, the 
government would likely prevail. German Chancellors Kohl and Schröder both won Federal 
Constitutional Court judgements after using constructive no-confidence votes to trigger early 
elections in 1982 and 2005, and there is no explicit restriction on the practice in FTPA. Given 
the risks of calling an early election, so brutally illustrated in 2017 – and, indeed, by Schröder’s 
defeat in 2005 –  a future government might not want to appear weak by losing a no-
confidence vote, even on its own initiative1. But the option would be there.  
 
Things look still more complicated if the government lacks a majority. FTPA makes it harder 
for minority governments to collapse. That may prolong their existence, but it does not 
necessarily make them more effective2. A minority government might find itself unable to pass 
legislation but prevented from calling a fresh election, even through the no-confidence route. 
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The question obviously arises of whether a credible opposition would vote against a motion 
expressing no confidence in the government, but it clearly could.  
 
Assuming the government retains a majority and does not want to pass a no-confidence 
motion in itself, the two-thirds threshold should ensure that no British prime minister can call 
an election simply to take advantage of favourable polls. Even Tony Blair’s landslide victory in 
1997 left him with less than two thirds of all MPs at his disposal. Most observers expected 
the super-majority route would only work in a national emergency or a case of total political 
gridlock. They asked why a government would want an election unless it expected to increase 
its majority, and why the opposition would agree if it expected to lose3. Sure enough, Theresa 
May acted in April 2017 because opinion polls predicted a Conservative landslide. Labour 
could have vetoed the whole thing. But, confounding observers’ earlier expectations, it 
demurred. 
 
Three plausible explanations exist for what looked, at the time, like an act of political suicide. 
First, while FTPA grants MPs the legal right to veto an early election, that power has never 
been used. Labour may not have grasped how significant a change FTPA involved. It could 
have rejected May’s request. It need not even have voted no – simply abstaining would have 
been enough, since calling an early election under FTPA with the present 650-seat 
configuration of the House of Commons requires 434 positive votes. Yet this did not 
necessarily seem obvious to the Labour leadership. FTPA is new. It has to compete for space 
in MPs’ imaginations with hundreds of years of accumulated precedents, all of which suggest 
the government should have the right to call an election when it chooses. Perhaps the first 
thing we learn from the 2017 election is that long-established conventions retain a powerful 
pull over the minds of politicians.  
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Second, forced to decide between two unattractive poultry-related metaphors, Labour likely 
preferred resembling turkeys (voting for Christmas) over chickens. As early as 2012, Patrick 
Dunleavy argued that FTPA lacked real substance, since no serious opposition leader can 
afford to appear afraid of voters4. His prediction – of a June 2014 election – failed because the 
Conservative Party’s opinion poll position never improved, meaning David Cameron was 
never confident he could win. Refusing to support an early election would have meant 
admitting that Labour expected to lose, and losers do not gain votes. Political calculations 
influence Britain’s unwritten constitutional rules, and on this occasion Labour’s calculation 
that opposing elections looks bad seems to have rendered its right to do so moot.  
 
Finally, of course, it is possible that Labour accurately anticipated its better-than-expected 
performance in the resulting election. As the campaign laid cruelly bare, Jeremy Corbyn is a 
more capable vote-winner than Theresa May. In the Labour Party’s much-expanded 
membership, and in the pro-Corbyn social movement Momentum, he possesses considerable 
and as yet under-studied advantages. It is possible he correctly predicted that he could beat 
the pollsters’ predictions. He may have understood that merely avoiding annihilation from 
such an apparently low base would secure his leadership; it is difficult to under-perform when 
expectations are so low. It is also possible that Labour recognised what academic research 
shows: voters punish governments that call unnecessary elections 5 . Straight after May’s 
announcement, a BBC video clip went viral when a voter identified as ‘Brenda from Bristol’, 
on hearing there would be an election soon, responded half in anger and half in shock; ‘you’re 
joking. Not another one?!’6. Brenda, it seems, may not have been alone in her exasperation.  
 
Early elections, we learned in 2017, can indeed happen under FTPA. Governments can 
propose a vote and dare the opposition to refuse. It is unclear what combination of 
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convention, confidence and fear of looking chicken caused Labour to accede to Theresa May’s 
request. It is clear that it could have refused. What will happen the next time a government 
demands an early election is consequently unknowable. We cannot tell whether a future 
government will take the risk May took, given what it cost her, nor how a future opposition 
will respond. We can say only what the options are, once the government decides it is time 




Not only did FTPA fail in practice to abolish the government’s power to call early elections, 
it also produced unintended results. This was in many ways unsurprising. Both MPs and Lords 
criticised the haste with which the government advanced the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, 
without serious pre-legislative consultation or scrutiny. Several issues arose during the 
legislative process, forcing the government to accept significant revisions. The most significant 
drafting changes affected no-confidence votes. FTPA introduced two innovations in this area. 
First, it stipulated the precise wording a motion of no confidence in the government must 
take to trigger an early election. Second, it introduced a fourteen-day delay between the 
government’s defeat on a no-confidence vote and the Prime Minister gaining the right to 
request parliament’s dissolution.  
 
Both innovations were necessary. Without the fourteen day time limit, a government could 
be left in power after defeat on a no-confidence vote for the remainder of the five year 
parliamentary term, able to act only under caretaker conventions. Without clearly stipulating 
what constituted a no-confidence vote, FTPA potentially opened the question to 
interpretation by the courts. Ministers originally proposed that the definition of confidence 
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should continue to be based solely on precedent. But it proved impossible to restrict when 
parliament could dissolve in some circumstances without covering every possible scenario. 
The very act of legislating made the matter potentially justiciable. This caused consternation. 
The Clerk of the House of Commons even asked the government to shelve the entire Bill, 
and to rely on the Standing Orders of the House – which are exempt from judicial scrutiny – 
to achieve its goals. In the end the government accepted an amendment at the Report Stage 
in the House of Lords that made the question difficult to dispute. A no-confidence motion 
that does not take the form stipulated in FTPA 2011 s2(4) might force the government to 
resign, but it cannot trigger an early election.  
 
Before FTPA three forms of no-confidence vote existed. First, MPs could approve an explicit 
motion stating they lacked confidence in the government, like the one that brought down 
James Callaghan’s Labour government in 1979 and launched Margaret Thatcher’s premiership. 
Second, MPs could implicitly express their lack of confidence in the government by voting 
down the Budget or the Queen’s Speech, as they did to Stanley Baldwin in 1924. Finally, the 
government could designate a contentious parliamentary vote as a question of confidence in 
itself.  
 
By specifying the form of words no-confidence motions must take to begin the process of 
triggering an early election, FTPA alters the conventions it replaced. Implicit and designated 
confidence motions remain possible, but they no longer carry the same force. Before FTPA, 
a government defeated on an implicit or designated confidence motion faced a choice: it could 
resign and recommend a successor, or call an election. Under FTPA, the option of calling an 
election only arises once fourteen days have elapsed with no government winning a positive 
confidence vote. Fourteen days can be a long time in British politics.  
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While this shift has implications for implicit confidence votes, it matters most for the 
designated sort. Prime Ministers have historically used the threat of a no-confidence vote to 
force rebellious back-benchers to choose between backing down and facing the electorate. 
As Lord Norton has noted, when FTPA broke the link between a designated confidence 
motion and the threat of a fresh election, it essentially abolished this power7. That weakened 
the executive’s power vis-à-vis the legislature.  
 
Both international and domestic comparisons suggest that the mere possibility of a designated 
confidence vote, even if none is explicitly threatened, bolsters a government’s parliamentary 
support. Historical experience suggests even implicit threats work, while comparison to 
recent examples underlines what governments have lost. Tony Blair shored up Labour 
support for war in Iraq in 2003 by suggesting a link between the final House of Commons 
vote and confidence in his government. David Cameron lacked the capacity to do the same 
over Syria in 2013, and lost8. Both Ted Heath (over accession in 1972) and John Major (over 
Maastricht in 1993) used designated confidence motions to corral Eurosceptic Conservative 
MPs into supporting Europe-related legislation. Facing the even greater challenge of navigating 
Brexit without a majority, Theresa May was unable to follow suit. Though she could still 
threaten to resign if her back-benchers deserted her, that threat carried much less weight. It 
no longer meant they themselves might lose their jobs.  
 
FTPA arguably makes more of a difference than has hitherto been observed. Others have 
shown how FTPA denuded Downing Street of the power to discipline government MPs with 
the threat of an early election, potentially giving greater licence to rebels. But few recognise 
that MPs have also gained something. A no-confidence vote in the government no longer 
automatically triggers a general election. That makes no-confidence votes intrinsically less of 
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a threat to rank-and-file MPs. Governments can resign if defeated on issues they consider 
matters of confidence. A no-confidence vote only leads to an election if it follows the formula 
prescribed by FTPA and MPs do not within fourteen days pass a fresh motion either restoring 
confidence to the existing government or conferring it upon a new government. The power 
to decide whether a no-confidence vote leads to a fresh election has not disappeared. It has 
instead been transferred to a majority of MPs.  
 
Designated confidence motions gave governments the power to trigger a game of chicken 
with parliamentary rebels, threatening an election to compel compliance. By interposing a 
fourteen day waiting period between a no-confidence vote and the point at which the Prime 
Minister can call a fresh election, FTPA gives that same power to back-benchers. Rebel 
government MPs – or junior coalition partners – can defect on a no-confidence vote, demand 
concessions, then reverse course before the fourteen day clock times out. Not only was 
Theresa May’s Brexit strategy hamstrung by her inability to use designated confidence motions 
to discipline rebels – of whichever persuasion – she also faced the constant possibility that a 
small group of MPs – whether hardline Brexiters, recalcitrant Remainers, the Scottish 
Conservative contingent or the DUP – could vote with the opposition to start the clock 
running towards a fresh election, knowing they alone had the power to turn back depending 
on who blinked first.  
 
Rebel MPs might use this threat in different ways. As with designated confidence motions, it 
seems unlikely that they would regularly, if ever, actually use a no-confidence vote to coerce 
the government. The stakes would be too high. But the mere possibility should influence 
government calculations. Rebels could use the shadow of a confidence vote to extract a policy 
shift, to win targeted public spending – as the DUP effectively did in reaching its confidence-
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and-supply arrangement with May after the 2017 election – or to demand a change in 
leadership, essentially reversing the way governments used it before FTPA.  
 
Among these possibilities, one stands out. In theory, government MPs could defy the whip, 
vote with the opposition on a no-confidence vote, then present the Prime Minister with an 
ultimatum: step down and accept a replacement candidate, or face electoral defeat. 
Conservative MPs seem unlikely to pursue this course. Just 15% of them can trigger a 
leadership ballot according to the Party’s rules. If an alternative candidate truly possessed 
broad support, it would be less risky for MPs to use internal mechanisms rather than 
threatening an election to get their way. Even so, meeting the 15% threshold during the 2017 
parliament required 48 MPs to turn against May. She could be defeated on a no-confidence 
motion by just four MPs switching sides. Arguably, FTPA allows smaller groups of rebels 
greater leverage over Number 10.  
 
Things look even more interesting when we consider the prospect of a future Labour 
government led by Jeremy Corbyn. Even allowing for Corbyn’s influence over the selection 
of new MPs, and the aura of victory that would necessarily surround his entry to Downing 
Street, it seems likely he would still enjoy only grudging support from many members of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party. That support could evaporate upon contact with governing 
reality. Unlike their Conservative counterparts, Labour MPs lack a decisive internal 
mechanism to remove their leader should they disapprove of his policies in office. Assuming 
Corbyn does not resign, the best Labour MPs can do is to trigger a fresh leadership election. 




Under the terms of FTPA, however, Labour back-benchers would have a new nuclear option 
in their interactions with a Corbyn-led government. They could use a no-confidence motion 
to give the leadership an ultimatum: stand aside and let the PLP choose a successor, or face 
the voters. Corbyn might prefer to take his chances in an election, especially after the 
experience of 2017, and that might in turn lead rebels to think again. But the possibility of 
forcing the issue would be there. It would be easier for Labour rebels to eject Jeremy Corbyn 
from Downing Street than it is for them to remove him from the Party leader’s office.  
 
Rebellious Conservative MPs tried to reformulate the no-confidence procedure during the 
1990s so they could target the Prime Minister without risking an election. They failed. By 
introducing a fourteen day waiting period after a no-confidence vote, FTPA has in effect 
reintroduced this possibility. It has shifted the balance of power from the executive to the 
legislature, granting back-bench MPs new leverage over the government. Whether they will 
in fact use the nuclear option remains to be seen. That they could do so, while retaining the 
power to reverse course should the government refuse to back down, looks clear. 
 
A lot can happen in fourteen days 
 
We have already seen that the fourteen day waiting period gives rebellious back-benchers 
room to negotiate hard with their erstwhile leaders. It also makes possible – albeit unlikely – 
a string of more peculiar scenarios.  
 
Firstly, FTPA makes it possible for a Prime Minister to gain office temporarily despite never 
having won an election and being unable to command a majority in the House of Commons. 
Under section 2(3), the fourteen day period that begins with a no-confidence vote can end in 
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one of two ways. Either the clock times out, and there must be a general election, or the 
House passes a motion stating ‘that this House has confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’.  
 
This is significant. FTPA could have required MPs to invest the government, abolishing the 
Royal Prerogative to appoint the Prime Minister and giving that right to the House of 
Commons. Similar investiture votes take place elsewhere. One cannot become German 
Chancellor without winning a vote in the Bundestag, or Scottish First Minister without winning 
a vote at Holyrood. No such procedure exists at Westminster. In fact, the wording of FTPA 
makes clear that one must be appointed Prime Minister before a positive confidence vote can 
be called. The question is not hypothetical; MPs do not choose who forms the government. 
Their power extends only to supporting Her Majesty’s Government. Her Majesty has to make 
the appointment first.  
 
Whips miscount. Senior politicians might sincerely believe that they have cobbled together a 
deal in the frantic period after a government loses a no-confidence vote – involving a change 
of policy, of leadership, of coalition structure or of governing party. They might be wrong. It 
would only become clear when the newly-appointed Prime Minister failed to get a positive 
confidence motion approved. Leading politicians would then have a choice. The largest parties 
could agree to call an election immediately using the two-thirds vote route, ending the 
uncertainty. They could even do a deal to grant the Prime Minister confidence, to temporarily 
legitimise their position, in return for an immediate election thereafter. They could also, either 
by design or disagreement, let the fourteen day clock run out. Under this final scenario, the 
new Prime Minister would remain in office, unelected and without parliamentary support, 
under the caretaker conventions described in the Cabinet Manual. Their main power would 
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be to set the date of the fresh election, and so formally to request parliament’s dissolution. 
They would remain in office until after the election result.  
 
Much would depend, at that point, on convention. The Cabinet Manual has no legal status. 
Nor do the caretaker conventions it describes. The Cabinet Secretary might argue it would 
be improper for the government to act outside of the bounds set down in the text, but they 
would have no legal authority to refuse ministerial instructions. In the event of a crisis, perhaps 
related to the situation in parliament, or perhaps unrelated to it, an unelected Prime Minister 
without the confidence of the House of Commons could nevertheless use the Royal 
Prerogative to deploy the armed forces or delay an election for the remainder of the existing 
parliament’s five-year duration. Though the explanatory notes to FTPA make clear that the 
Prime Minister is expected to use their power to delay an election (once the fourteen day 
clock runs out) only to complete essential business or to ensure that polling day falls on a 
Thursday, the actual text of the legislation imposes no such limitation, and there is no clear 
definition anywhere of what constitutes ‘essential business’. Francis Urquhart would 
undoubtedly approve.  
 
Secondly, a Prime Minister defeated on a no-confidence motion might refuse to resign, arguing 
that they cannot recommend a successor. They could do so even if an alternative candidate 
was in fact capable of winning a confidence vote. Again, the procedure for a positive 
confidence vote set out by FTPA assumes the new government has already been appointed 
by the Queen. Such an appointment cannot take place until the previous Prime Minister has 
either resigned or been dismissed. According to the Cabinet Manual, the ‘Prime Minister is 
expected to resign where it is clear that he or she does not have the confidence of the House 
and that an alternative government does have the confidence’, which suggests there would be 
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scope for the Cabinet Secretary to apply pressure to a recalcitrant PM9. But they would have 
no legal power to force the issue.  
 
Relatedly, a defeated Prime Minister could ask the Queen to prorogue parliament, making it 
impossible for a rival to win a positive confidence vote during the fourteen day waiting period. 
The Cameron government believed that such ‘political gamesmanship…would result only in 
a damning verdict from the electorate’ and warned that the ‘political safeguards in our 
constitution should not be underestimated’10. It is in fact unclear whether other governments 
have suffered penalties for attempting similar shenanigans. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper, for example, got away with using prorogation to avoid a no-confidence vote in 2008. 
The then Minister for Constitutional Reform told MPs during debate on FTPA that it would 
be for the Queen to step in at that point. Whether she actually would step in remains to be 
seen – since doing so would inevitably embroil her in party politics. But she, and she alone, 
would have the authority to intervene, something both the Cabinet Secretary and the Palace 
have repeatedly made clear they desperately want to avoid.  
 
Thirdly, the Prime Minister might be willing to resign but find the leader of the opposition 
unwilling to form a government. Lord Norton speculated that this scenario could leave Britain 
without a government, potentially for up to five years11. That remains theoretically possible, 
but highly implausible. The Cabinet Manual notes that ‘the government retains its 
responsibility to govern’ until it is clear that it can be replaced12. The Manual does not – 
indeed, it cannot, since there is no statutory basis for such a statement – say that the 
government must wait on its successor before submitting its resignation. This contrasts with 
the position in most international comparator states, which do not allow caretaker 
governments to resign13. But it is clear that the Queen can refuse to accept a government’s 
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resignation if she is not satisfied that a viable alternative exists – as Queen Victoria initially did 
when Lord Aberdeen attempted to step aside in favour of Viscount Palmerston in 1855. There 
is a meaningful distinction between the government’s tendering its resignation to the monarch, 
and the monarch’s acceptance. Before FTPA the monarch retained the right to refuse to 
dissolve parliament under certain circumstances, for example if scope remained for a viable 
alternative to be formed. George V, for example, stayed Ramsay MacDonald’s request to 
dissolve parliament in 1924 to confirm that neither the Liberal nor Conservative leaders stood 
ready to replace him as Prime Minister. FTPA makes that scenario impossible, but says nothing 
about the monarch’s right to refuse the government’s resignation. If the Prime Minister offers 
to resign without being able to recommend a successor, the Queen has the right – and, 
arguably, the duty – to refuse.   
 
It would in practice fall to the Queen’s Private Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary jointly to 
ensure that no outgoing Prime Minister is received at Buckingham Palace until they can 
credibly recommend a successor. Britain should only be left without a government if these 
two officials get their calculations wrong – if it becomes clear only in the minutes after the 
Prime Minister has resigned that no-one is in fact willing to take over. That seems implausible. 
It would require a spectacular breakdown in lines of communication, or outright dishonesty 
on somebody’s part.  
 
FTPA thus makes thinkable some peculiar scenarios that were unthinkable before it passed. 
Britain could wind up with an unelected Prime Minister who lacks the confidence of the House 
of Commons. The Queen could be forced to dismiss a Prime Minister who refused to give 
way to a credible successor. She could, just about, be left without a government, or forced 
to keep a Prime Minister in office who wished to step aside. Much would depend on 
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convention, on the Cabinet Manual, and on the behind-the-scenes maneuvering of two 
unelected officials – the Cabinet Secretary and the Queen’s Private Secretary.  
 
Conclusion: FTPA’s future 
 
Critics of FTPA frequently call for its repeal. As we have seen, FTPA does not in practice 
prevent governments calling opportunistic elections. Instead, it reduces their ability to 
discipline rebellious back-benchers, and potentially makes some strange scenarios possible. It 
has served its true political purpose, in that the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition ran 
its full five year course. Yet repeal may not be straightforward. 
 
Constitutional experts disagree over whether simply abolishing FTPA would restore the status 
quo ante. Andrew Blick, for example, argued that repealing FTPA would allow the Royal 
Prerogative to dissolve parliament to spring back into life, restoring the Prime Minister’s 
previous power14. In fact, the explanatory notes to FTPA make clear that much of the debate 
stems from a confusion reproduced in Blick’s argument. FTPA does not abolish the 
Prerogative of dissolution, it merely constrains it. Explanatory note 30 clarifies that, under 
s2(7) FTPA 2011, ‘dissolution does not follow automatically on a triggering event’, namely a 
two-thirds super-majority vote or an unmitigated no-confidence vote, and that in fact ‘the 
Queen sets the date for an early election by proclamation on the recommendation of the 
Prime Minister’15. Repealing FTPA would, in other words, largely restore the situation that 
existed before 2011, lifting the constraints imposed on the dissolution prerogative without 
affecting the underlying power. As Lord Norton rightly notes, the repeal legislation would 
need to reinstate the stipulations previously contained in the Septennial Act of 1715 and s7 
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Parliament Act 1911, which together limited the period between elections to five years and 
which were both themselves repealed by FTPA16. That hurdle is surely surmountable.  
 
Whether FTPA will in fact be repealed depends ultimately on politics. It depends on whether 
the main party leaders conclude the restrictions it imposes do them more harm than good. It 
depends on whether the government can secure a majority for repeal without the power of 
a designated confidence vote, a far-from-trivial consideration in a period of hung parliaments. 
It also depends on whether any of the strange scenarios set out in this article actually come 
to pass. Each involves, to some degree, the violation of constitutional conventions. While 
politicians can behave unconventionally without facing legal censure, one of the most 
significant facets of the UK constitution is that they generally do not. None of the more 
outlandish occurrences described above is likely. Yet all are possible, and that may be enough 
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